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Abstract 
Here we investigate the existence of credit in a cash-in-advance economy where 
there are complete markets but for the fact that agents cannot commit to repay their 
debts. Defectors are banned from the credit market but they can use money balances for 
saving purposes. Without uncertainty, deflation crowds out credit completely. The 
equilibrium allocation, however, is efficient if the government deflates at the time 
preference rate. Efficiency can also be restored with positive inflation. For any non 
negative inflation rate below the optimal level, the volume of credit and the real interest 
rate increase with inflation. Our results hold when idiosyncratic uncertainty is 
introduced and households are sufficiently impatient but in one instance: efficiency 
cannot be restored if the deflation rate is nearby the rate of time preference. Our 
numerical examples suggest that the optimal inflation rate is not too large for reasonable 
levels of patience and risk aversion. Finally, we present a framework where the use of 
money arises endogenously and show that it is tantamount to our cash-in-advance 
framework. Our results hold in this modified environment. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most persistent results in monetary theory is the Friedman rule, that states
that the optimal monetary policy entails zero nominal interest rates: that is, the monetary
authority should deflate at the time preference rate (in a deterministic steady setting). The
key issue is that if agents are forced to use money for transaction and saving purposes they
economize inefficiently on the use of money. To fix this monetary inefficiency, the central
bank must follow the Friedman Rule—it must eliminate the difference in returns between
money and non-monetary assets. Broadly speaking, this result is robust to various market
frictions. See, for instance, Kocherlakota (2005) for a survey in this matter.
In this paper we address this old question in a cash-in-advance economy where agents
cannot commit to repay their debts. Households do not value leisure. There are only two
assets: money and private bonds, which can be used for lending and borrowing purposes.
We assume that there is limited commitment as in Kocherlakota (1996), Kehoe and Levine
(2001), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). This implies that there must exist a centralized
credit agency that makes all the record keeping involved in borrowing and lending across
households. This credit agency is in charge of punishing households that default and make
sure that they are seized their bond holdings and are banned from the credit market forever.
Defectors, however, keep their money holdings and can save in the form of money balances.
That is, the government cannot tax away defectors’ monetary balances. As Kocherlakota
(1996), Kehoe and Levine (2001), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000), we assume that there is
no private information. This implies that the credit agency never lends off so much so that
agents prefer defaulting on their debts to participating in the credit market. Thus, although
there is no default in equilibrium, the amount of credit will depend on the return to default,
which depends on the inflation rate.
We focus on symmetric steady states. We find that, under full commitment, or, alterna-
tively, perfect enforcement, money is super neutral and the first best allocation is achieved:
complete consumption smoothing (complete risk sharing). When the government deflates at
the rate of time preference, households are indifferent about the composition of their portfo-
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lio. This is so because we have assumed that households do not value leisure. Nevertheless,
we wanted to stick to this simple setup with only one friction: limited commitment and
defaulters can save in the form of money.
We start by studying a deterministic economy where households alternate between high
and bad productivity. In this simple setup we show that contracting the monetary base
crowds out private credit completely. The reason for this is that, for any negative inflation
rate, the return to money is so high that households with debts are better off defaulting on
them and self insuring using money than participating in the credit market. Nevertheless,
households can achieve the full commitment allocation by using only money if the government
deflates at the rate of time preference. This is so because agents know perfectly their future
stream of endowments and can accumulate a finite amount of money balances to smooth
consumption completely. Next, we show that the amount of credit and the real return to
bonds rise with inflation for low levels of inflation. There exists a positive threshold for the
inflation rate at which the return to default is so low that the full commitment allocation can
be attained and the volume of credit is maximum. Above that threshold the consumption
allocation does not change with the level of inflation. This is a result of assuming that leisure
is not valued by households.
We extend our analysis to an economy where agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty in
their labor productivity. We assume that households can issue contingent bonds. The real
return to money, as opposed to that of bonds, is not contingent. We first study the economy
assuming that agents have full commitment. Differently from the deterministic case, the
full risk sharing allocation cannot be achieved by self insuring using money, since its return
is not contingent. Next, we turn to study the case with limited commitment. Defectors
behave as agents in Bewley (1983): they can self insure using a non contingent asset. We
show that if households are sufficiently impatient there cannot be full risk sharing if the
deflation rate is nearby the rate of time preference. This is so because credit is constrained
so that households with the highest productivity are indifferent between defaulting on their
debts and self insuring with money balances. Thus, the distribution of consumption across
agents depends on the distribution of wealth. A consequence of this is that there is no
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equilibrium if the deflation rate is nearby the rate of time preference. As in the case without
uncertainty, there exists a threshold for the inflation rate above which the economy can
attaint full risk sharing with credit. If households are sufficiently impatient (low discount
factor) the threshold is positive. We conduct some numerical examples and show that the
predicted optimal inflation rate is not too large, around 5 percent for reasonable parameter
values.
It could be argued that we have used an ad-hoc manner to introduce money in our setup.
We show that we can derive endogenously the cash-in-advance constraint in a framework
that resembles that of Lagos and Wright (2005): households alternate in being consumers
and producers. Utility, however, is not transferable and leisure is not valued. We need two
assumptions for money to be used in equilibrium: limited commitment and anonymity in
the goods market. In other words, households do not have any record keeping technology.
Financial institutions can keep track of households’ financial histories but not trading his-
tories. Credit agencies act as intermediaries allowing private IUOs to circulate, moreover,
they never lend so much so that borrowers are better off defaulting on their debts. We find
that this economy can be mapped exactly onto our cash-in-advance framework.
Our paper is related to Aiyagari and Williamson (2000). They use a model economy
where agents hold money balances because a random participation constraint prevents them
from fully participating in the credit market. Agents, however, can default on their debts,
case in which they are banned from the credit market thereafter. As in our case, the Friedman
rule is not optimal. Thus, random limited participation plays the same role that the cash-
in-advance constraint in our setting. Our paper is also related to Berentsen, Camera, and
Waller (2007). They allow for the existence of credit in the Lagos and Wright’s (2005)
framework. As in our setup, there is limited commitment. They, however, do not allow
the government to contract the monetary stock. Thus, they only consider economies with
non negative inflation. Their results are similar to that our economy without idiosyncratic
uncertainty: credit is unconstrained whenever the inflation rate is above a positive threshold.
We, however, can study the case of deflation in the deterministic economy as well the economy
with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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Our paper is also related to Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2006). They study the implications
of limited commitment in a very similar environment to ours but from the fact that money
is not needed for transaction purposes. Moreover, they assume that defectors can hold
positive amount of bonds. That is, financial intermediaries only can keep track of negative
bond holdings but cannot monitor positive bond holdings. The authors show that the
only sustainable policy entails (in the deterministic setting) zero inflation and zero nominal
interest rate. This result is very different from ours: in our setup, coexistence of money and
credit does not require zero nominal interest rate. In particular, the optimal inflation rate
is positive and the nominal interest rate is positive in our deterministic setting. As a result,
monetary policy can restore efficiency in our setting.
There are other instances where the Friedman Rule is not the optimal monetary policy.
That is the case in environments where the inflation tax is a proxy for other policies or taxes.
Levine (1991) argues that if the government cannot set taxes contingent upon individual’s
marginal utility an expansionary monetary policy amounts to transferring real resources
from those with low marginal utility to those with high marginal utility. That is the case
in Akyol (2004) where non contingent bonds are an imperfect means of smoothing away
idiosyncratic labor risk and wealthy agents hold precautionary money balances. Thus, the
inflation tax acts as a redistributive mechanism of wealth that is ex-ante welfare improving.
This is also the case in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005) and Williamson (2005).
As Kocherlakota (2005) argues, when the government has a complete array of alternative
taxes the Friedman Rule arises as the optimal monetary policy. Berentsen, Camera, and
Waller (2005), for instance, find that the government should use the Friedman Rule when
lump-sum taxes and transfers are available. Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2007) find
similar result in a search monetary model where the Hossios rule eliminates the inefficiencies
of bargaining. In our case the government has available those taxes, too, but with one
limitation: the government cannot tax discriminate between defaulters and non defaulters.
That is, the only punishment to defaulters is perpetual banning from the credit market, but
the government cannot tax away their precautionary money balances in a different manner
from non defaulters.
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Our result is close to that by He, Huang, and Wright (2005). They study the coexistence
of fiat money as a medium of exchange and private liabilities issued by institutions resembling
banks. They assume that agents can steal money from others. Thus, the government may
find optimal to set positive nominal interest rates to discourage illicit behavior. Finally,
Green and Zhou (2005) study a monetary economy which is very similar to our economy
without credit. There they show that aggregate welfare may rise with inflation for mild
levels of inflation because it makes it impossible for anyone to accumulate very large money
balances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment.
Section 3 studies the equilibrium assuming that agents have full commitment and derive the
efficient allocation. In section 4 we turn to study the economy with limited commitment
and characterize the optimal monetary policy. Section 5 extends our basic model to allow
for idiosyncratic uncertainty and characterize the optimal monetary policy. Here we include
some numerical examples. In section 6 we modify our original setup so that money arises
endogenously and show that our cash-in-advanced economy can be mapped into this one.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The benchmark model economy
Here we describe our benchmark economy. Section 2.1 describes individual preferences and
endowments, in sections 2.2 and 2.3 we describe the market arrangements and the govern-
ment’s monetary policy, and sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 state the recursive formulation of
stationary equilibrium for this economy.
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2.1 Population, preferences, endowments and production possi-
bilities.
Our basic environment is very similar to that in Kehoe and Levine (2001). There is an
infinite number of discrete time periods t = 0, 1, . . . . In each period there are two types of
households i = 1, 2 and a continuum of each type of households with measure one half. There
is a single consumption good c. Both types of households derive utility from consumption and
do not value leisure. The amount consumed by type i household at period t is denoted as cit.
We write lifetime utility as
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (ct). The period utility function is twice continuously
differentiable with u′(c) > 0, satisfies the boundary condition u′(c) → ∞ as c → 0 and has
u′′(c) < 0, and u′′′(c) > 0. The discount factor satisfies 0 < β < 1.
Households are endowed with one unit of time each period. Each period households
receive a shock to their efficiency units of labor w ∈ {wl, wh}, where wh > wl. Both shocks
are positive. We assume that when households of type 1 receive the shock wl households
of type 2 receive the shock wh. We start by assuming that productivity alternates between
high and low, so if wit = wh then w
i
t+1 = wl. The production of the unique consumption
good requires labor. The production function is linear, Y = L, where L is aggregate labor.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Trade is welfare improving,
u
(
wh + wl
2
)
> u (wh) + β u (wl) . (1)
This assumption ensures that complete consumption smoothing is strictly preferred to au-
tarky by all households.
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2.2 Market arrangements
We assume that households need money for transaction purposes and, as in Svensson (1989),
that consumption expenditures are determined by the amount of money balances held at the
end of the previous period. In addition to money households can hold private bonds, which
can be used for borrowing and lending purposes.
Households have the option of going bankrupt. In that case they are excluded from further
participation in the credit market and they are seized their bond holdings. However, they
cannot be seized their money holdings and they can save in the form of money after default.
Notice that this model requires the existence of a central agency to keep track of who has
gone bankrupt, to assure that their bond holdings are seized and that they do not continue
to borrow and lend. We assume that financial institutions are perfectly competitive and that
they cannot price discriminate in the sense that they charge the same interest rate to all
households. Moreover, we assume that there is perfect entry and exit in the financial sector.
Formally, this is a model in which households face the incentive compatibility constraint
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu
(
cis
) ≥ ∞∑
s=t
βs−tu
(
zis
)
, for all t ≥ 0. (2)
This says that in every period, the value of continuing to participate in the credit market is
no less than the value of defection. In this setting, the absence of private information implies
that no consumer actually goes bankrupt in equilibrium: the credit agency will never lend
so much to consumers so that they will choose bankruptcy.1
Notice the difference with Kehoe and Levine (2001). In our setup defection does not
mean that households turn to autarky.2 It rather implies that agents only can rely on self
insurance by accumulating real money balances. It could seem inconsistent to assume that
financial authorities can seize bond holdings but that they cannot seize money holdings. The
1Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that these incentive compatibility constraints can be reinterpreted as
state and agent-specific borrowing limits (or solvency constraints) set by financial institutions. In absence
of private information the solvency constraints ensure that agents will not default in equilibrium, since they
will never owe so much as to make them choose to default. That is, both modeling choices are equivalent.
2This also the case in Kocherlakota (1996), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
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reason for this assumption is twofold. First, financial authorities can seize bond holdings in
the sense that they can refuse to pay bond proceeds to defectors but we assume that they
cannot tax away individual’s money holdings, only the government can do that. Second, since
money is needed for transactions and marginal utility at zero approaches infinity, financial
authorities cannot seize all individual money holdings. The crucial assumption, however, is
that households can use money for saving purposes after defaulting on their debts, that is,
the government cannot tax away all defaulters’ savings.
The timing of the model is as follows: people work, consume, they are paid their return
to their labor endowments, decide whether to default on their debts or not and decide their
next period wealth as well as the composition of their portfolio.
2.3 The government
The government injects money in the economy as lump-sum transfers to agents. The aggre-
gate stock of money supply evolves according to the law
Mt+1 = (1 + θ)Mt, (3)
where θMt equals to the sum of all transfers. We are going to assume that the money growth
rate is always finite and greater than or equal to the rate of time preference, θ ∈ [β − 1,+∞).
It will be useful to express the law of motion of the aggregate supply of real money balances
in per capita terms,
mt+1 =
1 + θ
1 + εt+1
mt, (4)
where εt+1 = pt+1/pt − 1 is the inflation rate at period t+ 1.
We denote as T it+1 the monetary transfer (or tax) that household i receives at the end of
period t. The transfer in terms of consumption good at time t is T it+1/pt = (1 + εt+1) τ
i
t+1.
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We assume that money transfers (or taxes) are non redistributive,
(1 + εt+1) τ
i
t+1 =
wit
w
θmt, (5)
where w = (wh + wl) /2 is aggregate production. In the case in which the government chooses
to deflate, these lump-sum taxes are equivalent to imposing a flat tax rate equal to θmt/w.
If the government chooses to increase the monetary base these transfers are proportional
to real earnings. Using this scheme for injecting or withdrawing money ensures that the
money growth rate θ does not affect the distribution of earnings and, therefore, the amount
of credit. The reason for this assumption is that the government could set money transfers
to redistribute resources across households, leaving them indifferent between trading in the
bond market or not. We want to shut down completely this channel to focus only on the
effect of inflation through its effect on the return to default.
2.4 The household’s problem
The problem solved at period 0 by household of type i is
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cit)
s. t. ptc
i
t + q
n
t B
i
t+1 +M
i
t+1 ≤ ptwit +Bit +M it + T it+1,
ptc
i
t ≤ M it ,
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu (cis) ≥
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu (zis) , for all t.
(6)
Bit denotes nominal bond holdings at the beginning of period t, q
n
t is the nominal price of
bonds at time t, M it stands for money balances at the beginning of period t and T
i
t+1 is
the money injected by the government as transfers. The last inequality,
∑∞
s=t β
s−tu (cis) ≥∑∞
s=t β
s−tu (zis), is the incentive compatibility constraint. It says that agents never owe so
much so that they prefer to default on their debts. It imposes a lower limit on the amount
of bonds carried to next period, Bit+1. That is, financial intermediaries choose the maximum
amount of credit so that households are better off repaying their debts than defaulting on
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them. The problem solved after defaulting at time t is
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu (zis) = max
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu (cis)
s. t. psc
i
s +M
i
s+1 ≤ pswis +M is + T is+1,
psc
i
s ≤M is,
M it given.
(7)
Hereafter we will refer to the household’s problem shown in (6) as the “household’s problem”
or the problem “staying in trade”, whereas we will refer to the problem shown in (7) as the
“default problem”. Likewise, we will refer to
∑∞
s=t β
s−tu (zis) as the “utility after default”.
2.5 The cash-in-advance constraint and precautionary money bal-
ances
Here we write the household’s problem in real terms. We denote real money balances at the
beginning of period t as mit. The budget constraint and the cash-in-advance constraint can
be written as
cit + qt b
i
t+1 + (1 + εt+1)m
i
t+1 ≤ wit + bit +mit + (1 + εt+1) τ it+1,
cit ≤ mit,
(8)
where bit = B
i
t/pt is the real amount of bonds at the beginning of period t, 1+ εt+1 = pt+1/pt
is the rate of inflation, and qt = (1 + εt+1) q
n
t is the real price of bonds. Notice that the
difference mit−cit could be thought of as precautionary money balances held at the beginning
of period t.3 We are going to denote it as dit. In real terms the budget constraint and the
cash-in-advance constraint can be written as
(1 + εt+1) c
i
t+1 + qtb
i
t+1 + (1 + εt+1) d
i
t+1 ≤ wit + bit + dit + (1 + εt+1) τ it+1,
dit+1 ≥ 0,
(9)
3Using the term precautionary may seem incorrect since there is no uncertainty. Nevertheless, since we
will study the case with uncertainty we prefer to abuse language a bit instead changing names.
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This formulation shows clearly that choosingmit+1, next period real money balances, amounts
to choosing next period consumption and next period precautionary real money balances,
cit+1, and d
i
t+1. It also shows that consumption at period t+ 1 depends on the current state.
Now we proceed to define a recursive stationary equilibrium.
2.6 Recursive stationary equilibrium
In a steady state the inflation rate is constant and equal to the money growth rate, θ. The
aggregate level of production is equal to w = (wh + wl) /2. The per capita amount of money
balances, m, is equal to aggregate consumption plus the aggregate precautionary money
balances, m = w+d1/2+d2/2. Thus, aggregate money balances and prices will only depend
on the monetary policy that is completely summarized by θ.
The household’s problem
The individual state variable is the variable x = {j, b, d}, where j denotes the household’s
productivity level, j = h, l. The problem solved by a household of productivity level j stated
recursively is
V (j, b, d; θ) = max
c≥0,
b′,
d′≥0
{u (c) + β V (−j, b′, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c+ q b′ + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wj + b+ d+ wjw θm,
V (j, b, d; θ) ≥ VD (j, d; θ) ,
if j = h, then − j = l, and vice versa,
(10)
Notice that the lower limit on the amount of bonds, b′, is set implicitly by the incentive
compatibility constraint faced next period, V (−j, b′, d′; θ) ≥ VD (−j, d′; θ): the amount of
borrowing cannot be so large as to make agents to default on their debt. The utility after
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default VD (j, d; θ) satisfies
VD (j, d; θ) = max
z≥0,
d′≥0
{u (z) + β VD (−j, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) z + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wj + d+ wjw θm,
if j = h, then − j = l, and vice versa.
(11)
The incentive compatibility constraint is rewritten as V (j, b, d; θ) ≥ VD (j, d; θ). Notice
that we are using the same notation for the amount of precautionary money balances held
either in trade or in default, d. We are abusing notation a bit, since, typically, the amount
of money balances will depend on participating in the credit market. We do so to simplify
notation and to stress that households can keep their money balances after default. Whenever
there is a possibility of confusion we will point out the difference.
Steady state equilibrium
Now we can define a steady state equilibrium with incentive compatibility constraints. Re-
member that the individual state variable is denoted as x and summarizes the household’s
productivity and initial amount of bonds and precautionary money balances.
Definition 1. An incentive compatible steady state equilibrium for this economy is a mon-
etary policy, θ, an aggregate amount of money balances, m, a price for bonds, q, a set of
functions
{
V (x; θ) , gc (x; θ), gb (x; θ), gd (x; θ)
}
, and a stationary measure of households µ
an such that:
1. given µ, q, the monetary policy, θ, and m, the functions
{
V (x; θ) , gc (x; θ), gb (x; θ),
gd (x; θ)
}
solve the household’s problem, given
{
VD (j, d; θ), f
d (j, d; θ) , f z (j, d; θ)
}
,
which solve solve the default problem given µ, q, m, and the monetary policy θ,
2. markets clear:
(a)
∫
X
gc(x) d µ =
∫
X
w dµ,
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(b)
∫
X
gb(x) d µ = 0,
(c) m =
∫
X
(
gd(x) + gc(x)
)
d µ,
3. and the measure of household is stationary, µ(B) =
∫
X
P (x,B) d µ, for all B ⊂ B.
We are going to examine symmetric incentive compatible steady states. In a symmet-
ric steady state the level of consumption of each household only depends on its level of
productivity. That is, cit = ch if w
i
t = wh and c
i
t = cl if w
i
t = wl, for all i and t. Thus,
the equilibrium bond and precautionary money holdings satisfy bj = g
b (−j, b−j , d−j; θ),
dj = g
d (−j, b−j , d−j; θ), for j = h, l, and bh + bl = 0. Likewise, the after default allocation
is defined as zit = zh, d
i
t = dh if w
i
t = wh, and z
i
t = zl, d
i
t = dl, if w
i
t = wl. Finally, we should
keep in mind that all consumption levels, credit and money holdings are functions of the
money growth rate, θ, but we will omit it unless necessary.
3 Efficiency and full commitment
In this section we investigate the existence of credit when borrowers can commit to repay
their debts. We will compare the equilibrium allocation of our benchmark economy with the
equilibrium allocation in this case.
3.1 The efficient allocation
The efficient allocation is the one that solves the social planner’s problem
max
c1t ,c
2
t
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c1t ) +
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c2t )
s. t.
c1t
2
+
c2t
2
= w.
(12)
13
Denoting as ch the consumption level when a household of type i has the high productivity
shock and cl when it is low we can simplify the social planner’s problem to the static problem
max
ch,cl
1
2
u (ch) +
1
2
u (cl)
s. t. ch
2
+ cl
2
= w,
(13)
where it is easy to see that the efficient allocation entails full risk sharing, ch = cl = w.
Thus, efficiency implies that household’s consumption is invariant with respect to household’s
income. Now we turn to the decentralization of the efficient allocation.
3.2 Equilibrium under full commitment
The symmetric efficient allocation can be decentralized under full commitment. Solving the
problem of full commitment only requires to drop the incentive compatibility constraint from
the household’s problem shown in (10) and substitute it by a non Ponzi scheme constraint.
Existence of equilibrium requires 1+ θ ≥ β. It is easy to check that, under full commitment,
the price of the bond must be equal to the discount factor, β. Since bonds, as opposed to
money, can be held in negative amounts the bond price cannot be higher than the price of
money, q ≤ 1+ θ. The level of consumption is w, regardless of the household’s productivity.
The household’s portfolio satisfies
(1 + θ)w + q b−j + (1 + θ) d−j =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
wj + bj + dj, j = h, l, (14)
bh + bl = 0, (15)
dj ≥ 0, j = h, l, (16)
w +
1
2
dh +
1
2
dl = m. (17)
There are two possible cases. Either 1 + θ > β, case in which the nominal return to bonds
is positive, or the case in which 1 + θ = β, that is, the nominal interest rate is zero.
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Equilibrium with positive nominal rates
This is the case when the government sets an inflation rate larger than the rate of time
preference, 1 + θ > β. Then, households choose dh = dl = 0. It is easy to check that
households borrow when they have low productivity. When they have high productivity
they repay their debts, consume and save for next period. Using (15) and (14) we can see
that the maximum amount of debt is
bh = b
E
h (θ) ≡ −
(1 + θ)
1 + β
(w − wl) . (18)
We will refer to the amount bEh (θ) as the maximum amount of credit given the inflation
rate θ. This level of credit is similar to the “natural borrowing limit” discussed by Aiyagari
(1994). That is, if the household is allowed to borrow more than bEh (θ) and can commit to
repay its debts it will never exhaust the borrowing limit.
Equilibrium with zero nominal rates
This is the case when the government sets the deflation rate equal to the rate of time
preference, 1 + θ = β. In this case the portfolio composition is indeterminate since the real
return to bonds is equal to the real return of money. Any composition of bonds and money
that satisfy (14)–(17) is optimal, in particular, households could choose to not use bonds
and save in the form of money. In this case the amount of money holdings satisfies
(1 + θ)w + β dl =
(
1 + (β − 1)m
w
)
wh + dh, (19)
dj ≥ 0, j = h, l, (20)
w +
1
2
dh +
1
2
dl = m. (21)
That is, it is possible to attain full insurance using only money if the government deflates at
the time preference rate. We will come back to this issue in section 5, where productivity
is stochastic. Finally, notice that there exists a continuum of equilibria, since the portfolio
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composition is not determined.
4 The incentive compatible steady state
The section is organized in the following way. We first characterize the default allocation.
Next, we characterize incentive compatible symmetric steady states. Finally, we give con-
ditions under which the full commitment allocation is an incentive compatible steady state
allocation.
4.1 The default allocation
First we turn to investigate the household’s decisions after default. In this case, the problem
solved by the household is shown in expression (11). Notice that defectors cannot borrow
and they are restricted to use money whose gross real return is 1/(1 + θ). If (1 + θ) ≥
βu′ (wl)/u′ (wh), defectors never save, dl = dh = 0, and their consumption equals their
productivity; that is, they are effectively in autarky. For (1 + θ) < βu′ (wl)/u′ (wh) the
solution to the default problem is characterized by the following equations,
(1 + θ) u′ (zl) = β u′ (zh) , (22)
(1 + θ) u′ (zh) ≥ β u′ (zl) , (23)
dj ≥ 0, j = h, l, (24)
(1 + θ) zj + (1 + θ) dj =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
w−j + d−j, j = h, l, (25)
Equation (22) implies that the non negativity constraint on precautionary money balances
is not binding when the household has high productivity whereas equation (23) says that
it may bind in the low productivity state. As a matter of fact, it is easy to show that
defectors always choose to save whenever they have high productivity, dl > 0. If 1 + θ > β
the household chooses dh = 0. If the government deflates at the rate of time preference the
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value of dh is indeterminate. Finally, utility after default for the household starts with the
high productivity state is
VD (h, d; θ) =
u (zl) + β u (zh)
1− β2 . (26)
4.2 Characterization of the symmetric incentive compatible steady
state
The symmetric incentive compatible steady state is characterized by the equations
q u′ (cj) ≥ β u′ (c−j) , j = h, l, (27)
V (j, bj , dj; θ) =
u (c−j) + β u (cj)
1− β2 , j = h, l, (28)
V (j, bj , dj; θ)− VD (j, dj ; θ) ≥ 0, j = h, l, (29)
(1 + θ) u′ (cj) ≥ β u′ (c−j) , j = h, l, (30)
dj ≥ 0, j = l, h, (31)
(1 + θ) cj + q bj + (1 + θ) dj =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
w−j + b−j + d−j, j = l, h, (32)
bl + bh = 0, (33)
m = w +
1
2
dl +
1
2
dh. (34)
Notice that if the incentive compatibility constraint, V (j, bj , dj; θ) ≥ VD (j, dj ; θ), is not
binding when the household has productivity j, the first order condition with respect to bj ,
shown in expression (27), must hold with strict equality. The next proposition states the
conditions under which precautionary money holdings are zero.
Proposition 1. For any 1 + θ > β, at the incentive compatible symmetric steady state
equilibrium the amount of precautionary money balances held in the high productivity state
is zero, dh = 0.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
This proposition ensures that if 1 + θ > β households do not hold any precautionary money
balances when they enter the high productivity state. Since only households with high
productivity have incentives to default, this proposition implies that, if they defaulted (which
does not happen in equilibrium), they would would start out in the default state with zero
precautionary money balances, which is the amount optimally chosen by a defector.
4.3 Credit in deflationary economies
Now we can describe some properties of the incentive compatible symmetric steady states.
We first focus on steady states when the inflation rate is negative, θ < 0.
Proposition 2. For any negative rate of inflation, the amount of credit in the symmetric
participation constrained equilibrium is zero, bh = bl = 0.
Proof. We are going to show that the incentive compatibility constraint is never satisfied for
the household with high productivity when inflation is negative. In order to do so we rewrite
the problem solved by the household with high productivity in the following way:
max u (cl) + β u (ch)
s. t. (1 + θ) cj + q bj + (1 + θ) dj =
(
1 + θ m
w
)
w−j + b−j + d−j , j = h, l,
dj ≥ 0, j = h, l,
u (cl) + β u (ch) ≥ u (zl) + β u (zh) .
(35)
Likewise, the problem solved by that household after default can be written as
max u (zl) + β u (zh)
s. t. (1 + θ) zj + (1 + θ) dj =
(
1 + θ m
w
)
w−j + d−j, j = h, l,
dj ≥ 0, j = h, l.
(36)
Since dl ≥ 0 and dl ≥ 0 we can write the budget constraints associated to each problem in
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the following way
(1 + θ) zh + zl =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
wl +
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wh +
[
1
1 + θ
− (1 + θ)
]
dh, (37)
(1 + θ) ch + cl =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
wl +
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wh +
[
1
1 + θ
− (1 + θ)
]
dh+(
1− q
1 + θ
)
bl +
(
1
1 + θ
− q
)
bh. (38)
Since in equilibrium bh + bl = 0, we can write (38) as
(1 + θ) ch + cl =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
wl +
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wh +
θ (1 + q)
1 + θ
bl +
[
1
1 + θ
− (1 + θ)
]
dh. (39)
Notice that if there is credit in equilibrium it must be the case that bl > 0. Moreover,
since the household keeps its money balances after declaring default, dh = dh. Recall that
dh = dh = 0 for any inflation rate that satisfies 1 + θ > β. Since inflation is negative,
θ < 0, it follows that (1 + θ) ch + cl < (1 + θ) zh + zl. That is, any allocation with credit
that satisfies all the first order conditions of the symmetric steady state, but the incentive
compatibility constraint, is in the interior of the budget set faced by the households after
default. This implies that the only incentive compatible symmetric steady state involves no
credit, bh = bl = 0.
The consequence is that the only possible equilibrium is one without credit. Households
only can use self insurance. Notice that this result depends on the government’s ability to
tax defectors. If the government could seize their entire precautionary money holdings the
result would disappear. Thus, a key issue is why the government cannot tax discriminate
between defaulters and non defaulters.
Corollary 1. For any negative rate of inflation the price of bonds satisfies q = 1 + θ and
the incentive compatible equilibrium allocation is characterized by
(1 + θ) u′ (cl) = β u′ (ch) , (40)
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dl ≥ 0, dh ≥ 0, (41)
(1 + θ) c−j + (1 + θ) d−j =
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
wj + dj, j = l, h, (42)
1
2
ch +
1
2
cl = w, (43)
1
2
dh +
1
2
dl =m. (44)
Notice that, differently from the full commitment case, the price of the bond equals the price
of money for negative inflation rates. In other words, the nominal interest rate is zero for
any negative inflation rate. This is so because high productivity households are indifferent
between saving in the form of bonds or in the form of money, consequently, choosing bh = 0
is optimal for them. Households with low productivity cannot borrow because they would
default on any amount borrowed in the following period. Thus, the borrowing limit is
exactly zero. This restriction is binding if 1+ θ > β (low productivity households would like
to borrow) and it is not if 1+ θ = β, since all households can smooth consumption perfectly
by selfinsuring using money.
Thus, if there is deflation credit disappears. Nevertheless, if the government contracts
the monetary stock at the rate of time preference the equilibrium allocation is efficient in
spite of the non existence of credit.
Corollary 2. The incentive compatible symmetric steady state allocation is efficient if the
inflation rate satisfies, β = 1 + θ.
This corollary is an immediate consequence of the characterization of the steady state.
Households with high productivity save so much that full insurance is attained. We will see
in section 5 that the existence of this equilibrium relies on the existence of complete markets,
as is the case here.
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4.4 The case of zero inflation
If the inflation rate is zero, θ = 0, the amount of precautionary holdings carried to the high
state, dh, is zero, either in trade or after default. Moreover, by looking at the intertemporal
budget constraint faced after default, shown in (37), we can see that the default allocation
is feasible, zl + zh = wl + wh. Assumption 1 implies that u
′(wh) < β u′(wl). This inequality
implies, by strict concavity of the instantaneous utility function, that there is no other feasible
allocation that gives at least the default utility. That is, the default consumption allocation
is the unique equilibrium allocation in the incentive compatible steady state. Notice that
this allocation can be sustained with credit, too, by setting dh = dl = 0, the price of bonds
equal to one, and the amount of debt
bh = − wh − zl
2
, (45)
which is negative since zl < wh. In this equilibrium households are indifferent between staying
in trade and defaulting since they attain exactly the same allocation in both situations.
Notice also that the nominal and the real interest rates are zero. Households are rolling over
their debts from one period to another and this policy is incentive compatible.4
4.5 Credit in inflationary economies
Now we turn to analyze the case of inflation. The next proposition establishes for which
level of inflation there is credit and when full insurance can be achieved.
Proposition 3. There exists a strictly positive level of inflation, θ∗ > 0, such that for any
positive inflation rate below that threshold, θ ∈ [0, θ∗), the level of consumption at the high
state, ch = ch(θ), and the price of the bond, q = q(θ), are continuous and strictly monotonous
4This result is also found by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2006). In their setup, households only have one
asset, private bonds. Defectors are allowed to purchase bonds (they can save) but they cannot issue bonds
(they cannot borrow). We obtain the same result that Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2006): the price of bonds
must be equal to one. That is, real and nominal return on assets must be zero. In our setup, where money
is needed to purchase consumption goods, this equilibrium arises when the inflation rate is equal to zero.
We will come back to this issue in section 4.6.
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functions of the inflation rate in the interval [0, θ∗] and satisfy q(0) = 1, q (θ∗) = β, ch(0) >
wl, and ch (θ
∗) = w. When θ > θ∗ the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding at the
symmetric steady state.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We have seen in the previous section 4.4 that for θ = 0 the default allocation gives
higher utility than the full commitment allocation to the household with high productivity,
u(zl) + β u(zh) > (1 + β) u (w). Since the utility yielded by the default allocation is strictly
decreasing with θ, there exists a positive level of inflation, θ∗, for which the default allocation
gives exactly the same level of utility that the full commitment allocation. This implies that,
for any level of inflation above that threshold, θ ≥ θ∗, the full commitment allocation is
incentive compatible. The price of bonds is equal to β and the amount of credit is given by
expression (18). The nominal interest rate is equal to (1 + θ) /β − 1, which is positive.
For any level of inflation in the interval θ ∈ [0, θ∗) the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding for the high productivity household. In other words, the low productivity household
is credit constrained, which implies that the volume of credit is lower than the amount of
credit in the case of full commitment. As the inflation rate approaches θ∗, utility after default
decreases. This implies that households prefer to stay in trade for a larger amount of debt.
Thus, credit increases and the price of bonds decreases. Note also that for any θ ∈ (0, θ∗]
the price of bonds is lower than the inflation factor, q < 1+θ. This implies that the nominal
interest rate is positive. The real interest rate is positive and increases with inflation for any
θ ∈ (0, θ∗].
Any inflation beyond θ∗ has no real effect on the economy. This is so because we have
assumed that leisure is not valued. If we had assumed otherwise the results would change
slightly. In such a case, the optimal monetary policy under full commitment would be the
Friedman rule, too. In absence of full commitment, our Proposition 2 would still hold for
θ = 1 + β but it is not clear that it would hold for any negative inflation rate because
the optimal inflation rate rate would also depend on the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure, and not only on the discount factor.
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Notice the importance of limited commitment. In the case of full commitment, inflation
has no effects on the consumption allocation because inflation does not alter the amount of
credit. With limited commitment, however, inflation reduces the return to default, which,
in its turn, affects the volume of credit. It could be argued that our result depends on the
assumed scheme of money transfers. As discussed before, if the government could use taxes
to punish defectors, the link between credit and inflation investigated here would vanish and,
therefore, the optimal deflation rate is the rate of time preference. Thus, it is critical the
fact that government cannot tax discriminate between defaulter and non defaulters. We also
have assumed that the government uses proportional taxes (or transfers) to withdraw or to
inject money in the economy. If taxes (or transfers) were lump-sum the government would
effectively be redistributing resources from low productivity households to high productivity
households. Our results, though, would go through.5
We have found that households can attain full insurance by only using money if the
government deflates at the rate of time preference, 1 + θ = β. This is so because households
know exactly their future stream of productivity and can accumulate a finite amount of
money to self insure perfectly. We will see in section 5 that this result vanishes in the
presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
4.6 The role of banning defectors from the credit market and the
cash-in-advance constraint
We have assumed that defaulters only can save in the form of money. This is equivalent to
assuming that the credit agency has the ability to track positive bond holdings as well as
negative positions in bonds. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the credit agency
only has the ability to monitor negative bond holdings. For credit to exist in this alternative
model economy the price of bonds would have to be equal to one, q = 1 (see Appendix B).
Since the real return to money has to be no less than the real return to bonds, 1+θ ≥ q, the
5A lump-sum tax in this framework is equivalent to an income tax rate equal to θmt/wit, which is
regressive. This reinforces our result since this tax policy shifts resources from low productivity households
to high productivity households, which have the incentives to default on their debts.
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existence of credit requires the inflation rate to be not negative. Any non negative inflation
rate, θ ≥ 0, would be optimal since the cash-in-advance constraint prevents money from
disappearing. Households, though, would not keep any precautionary money balances. In
this environment households are rolling their debts over time and such policy is sustainable
for any θ ≥ 0. Thus, the level of the nominal interest rate does not affect the equilibrium,
since the real interest rate is zero for any non negative inflation rate. As opposed to our
benchmark economy, inflation has no further effect on the equilibrium allocation. This is so
because inflation does not affect the return to default (defectors do not hold precautionary
money balances) and, therefore, it does not affect the volume of credit. Thus, in our setup
the resulting equilibrium depends on the monitoring technology that financial institutions
have access to.
This result brings some insights about the role of the cash-in-advance constraint. Suppose
that money is not needed for transaction purposes and that defectors can purchase (but not
issue) private bonds. Coexistence of money and bonds dictates q = 1 + θ and existence
of credit, as we have seen, q = 1. That is, zero nominal and real interest rate. On the
contrary, suppose that money is not needed for transaction purposes but defectors cannot
purchase private bonds. Then, only defectors would hold money. Since there is no default in
equilibrium, coexistence of credit and money dictates zero nominal interest rate and existence
of credit q = 1.6 In either case monetary policy cannot restore efficiency. Thus, the presence
of the cash-in-advance constraint coupled with the banks’ ability to track positive bond
holdings and seize those of defectors allows the government to set a real return to money lower
than the return to bonds and restore efficiency without money disappearing. In section 6 we
describe a set of market and informational frictions that allow the cash-in-advance constraint
to arise in equilibrium.
In the following section we extend our analysis to the case in which households are subject
to idiosyncratic uncertainty. Hereafter we keep assuming that financial institutions can keep
track of positive bond holdings and seize those of defectors. The main departure from the
current setting is that private bonds are contingent whereas money is not.
6If there were default in equilibrium and defectors could not purchase bonds, this result would not
necessarily hold.
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5 A stochastic environment
We modify our physical environment so that agents’ productivity can be represented as
an idiosyncratic shock. We assume that productivity at period t is drawn from the set
W = {w1, . . . , wn}, where wi < wi+1, for any i = 1, . . . , n, and w1 > 0. The shock is
Markov with transition matrix Π = (πij)n×n. The associated stationary distribution of
productivities is the vector (η1, . . . , ηn). We assume that there are complete markets but
for the fact that households cannot commit to repay their debts. That is, households trade
Arrow securities in bonds. Notice, however, that money balances are not contingent. The
following assumption ensures that trade is always welfare improving,
Assumption 2.
(u (w) , . . . , u (w))H > (u (w1) , . . . , u (wn))H, (46)
where H is the matrix (I − βΠ)−1 and w =< η, (w1, . . . , wn) >.
This assumption says that households prefer to stay in trade rather than going to autarky,
even if they start out with the highest level of productivity. The following assumption will
simplify our analysis,
Assumption 3. The elements of the transition matrix Π satisfy πij ∈ (0, 1) for all i, j.
This assumption implies that the transition matrix has a unique ergodic set and it is the
matrix itself. As in our benchmark economy, default entails being banned from the credit
market. Defaulters only can save using money balances.
5.1 The household’s problem
Here we state the recursive formulation of the household’s problem in real terms. Appendix C
describes the household’s problem in the sequential formulation and the derivation of the
budget constraint in real terms as well as the recursive equilibrium definition.
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The individual state variable is the variable x = {j, b, d}, where j denotes the household’s
productivity level. The problem solved by a household of productivity level j is
V (j, b, d; θ) = max
ci≥0
n∑
i=1
πji [u (ci) + β V (i, b
′
i, d
′
i; θ)]
s. t. (1 + θ) ci +
n∑
s=1
q (j, s) b′s + (1 + θ) d
′
i ≤ wj
(
1 + θ m
w
)
+ b+ d, for all i,
u (ci) + β V (i, b
′
i, d
′
i; θ) ≥ VD (j, i, d; θ) , for all i,
d′i ≥ 0, for all i.
(47)
where VD (j, i, d; θ) satisfies
VD (j, i, d; θ) = max
zi≥0
{
u (z) + β
n∑
κ=1
πi κVD (i, κ, d
′; θ)
}
s. t. (1 + θ) z + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wj
(
1 + θ m
w
)
+ d,
d′ ≥ 0.
(48)
Let us discuss briefly why the household’s problem is written this way. We have argued that
choosing next period money balances, mt+1, amounts to choosing the sum of next period
consumption and precautionary money balances, ct+1 + dt+1. Notice that money is not a
contingent asset. Thus, at the beginning of period t + 1, the sum ct+1 + dt+1 is always the
same and equal to the previously decided amount of money balances, mt+1, but each item,
ct+1 and dt+1, could depend on the state faced by the household at period t + 1. This is
why the problem is written as if the household faced a sequence of budget constraints, one
per each productivity state tomorrow. These budget constraints are linked by the amount
of contingent bonds carried by households from period t to period t+ 1.
Let us turn now to the default problem. Defectors cannot purchase nor sell bonds. This
means that they cannot shift resources from one state to another. This is why the problem
faced by a defector is equivalent to solving one maximization problem per each possible
state at period t+ 1, as shown in expression (48). See Appendix C for details. Notice that
defectors behave like Bewley (1983) type of agents: they only can use a non contingent asset
for self insurance purposes. This is the main difference with the deterministic case. As in
26
the previous section, we call the constraint
u (ci) + β V (i, b
′
i, d
′
i; θ) ≥ VD (j, i, d; θ) , for all j, i, for all d ∈ R+, given θ, (49)
the incentive compatibility constraint.
5.2 Efficiency and full commitment
As in the case of certainty, the efficient allocation is the one that maximizes the social
planner’s problem and implies full risk sharing, ct = w, for all households.
Let us now turn to the decentralization of the full risk sharing allocation under full
commitment. The household’s problem is the one shown in (47) but for the incentive com-
patibility constraint shown in (49). As in the deterministic case, we will focus our attention
to symmetric steady states, which are characterized by the following set of equations:
q(j, s)
n∑
κ=1
πjκu
′ (cκ) = β πjs
n∑
κ=1
πsκu
′ (cκ) , for all j, s = 1, . . . , n, (50)
(1 + θ) u′ (cs) ≥ β
n∑
κ=1
πsκu
′ (cκ) , for all s = 1, . . . , n, (51)
ds ≥ 0, for all s = 1, . . . , n, (52)
n∑
j=1
ηj bj = 0, (53)
m = w +
n∑
j=1
ηj dj, (54)
(1 + θ) (ci + di) +
n∑
s=1
q (j, s) bs = wj
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
+ bj + dj, for all j, i = 1, . . . , n. (55)
Here the fact that the real return to money is not contingent poses a problem that is sum-
marized on the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In a symmetric steady the consumption allocation is the efficient allocation,
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cj = w, for all j.
Proof: See Appendix C.
This is a consequence of the return of money not being contingent. If consumption varies
across states the amount of money changes across states, too. The fact that the return to
money is not contingent would imply that the amount of precautionary money balances and
consumption would depend on the household’s wealth. Thus, in a symmetric steady state
consumption is constant across states. By feasibility, symmetry implies full risk sharing.
Notice that this result does not depend on households ability to commit to repay their
debts. It depends on the existence of idiosyncratic uncertainty and on the fact that money
is the non contingent asset. The following two corollaries are a consequence of consumption
being constant across states.
Corollary 3. In a symmetric steady the amount of precautionary money balances are con-
stant across states, dj = d, for all j.
Corollary 4. If the inflation rate is higher than the rate of time preference, 1 + θ > β, the
amount of precautionary money balances at the symmetric steady state is zero, dj = 0, for
all j = 1, . . . , n.
Now we can characterize the symmetric equilibrium under full commitment.
Corollary 5. The unique symmetric steady state in the full commitment economy is char-
acterized by
q(j, s) = πjsβ, for all j, s = 1, . . . , n. (56)
cj = w, for all j = 1, . . . , n. (57)
n∑
j=1
ηj bj = 0, (58)
(1 + θ)w + θ d+
n∑
s=1
q (j, s) bs = wj
(
1 + θ
m
w
)
+ bj , for all j = 1, . . . , n, (59)
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m = w + d. (60)
Notice that the price of a bond that yields one unit of consumption good at every state is β,
as in the certainty case. Notice also that money is dominated by bonds since households can
borrow as much as they want and their return is contingent. Hence, households can never be
better off using money than bonds. Nevertheless, the household’s portfolio is indeterminate
if the government deflates at the time preference rate, 1 + θ = β.
It is easy to check that the household with the highest productivity holds a negative
amount of bonds. Hence, in the limited commitment case the high productivity household
will have incentives to default.
5.3 The incentive compatible steady state and the optimal mon-
etary policy
In this section we start by discussing the existence of symmetric incentive compatible steady
states and then we turn to describe the conditions under which the optimal monetary policy
entails a money growth rate strictly higher than the preferences discount rate.
Proposition 5. If there exists a symmetric incentive compatible steady state it is the full
commitment symmetric steady state.
Proof. Proposition 4 tells us that in a symmetric steady state the consumption allocation is
the full risk sharing allocation, regardless of the existence of either full or limited commit-
ment. Thus, if the full risk sharing allocation is not incentive compatible there is no other
symmetric incentive compatible steady state.
The question that arises is for which range of the inflation rate, given the discount factor,
the full risk sharing allocation is incentive compatible. Hence, characterizing the conditions
under which the full risk sharing allocation is the symmetric incentive compatible steady
state is equivalent to characterizing the optimal monetary policy.
29
To characterize the optimal inflation rate we use a guess and verify method. We guess
that the full risk sharing allocation is the incentive compatible steady state allocation. Then
we turn to characterize the inflation rate for which the incentive compatibility is exactly
binding for the household with the highest productivity state. Without loss of generality we
assume hereafter that households do not hold any precautionary money balances. We start
by showing that utility after default, VD (j, i, d; θ) is decreasing with the inflation rate.
Lemma 1. VD (j, i, d; θ) is decreasing in θ.
(Proof: See Appendix C). Notice that utility after default approaches utility in autarky
as the inflation rate becomes arbitrarily large, since the real return to money goes to zero.
The next Lemma shows that there exist a threshold for the inflation rate such that, for any
inflation rate lower than the threshold, utility after default is strictly higher than the utility
of the full commitment allocation.
Lemma 2. If θ ≤ − w−w1
wn−w1 , then VD (n, i, d; θ) >
u(w)
1−β , for all i, for all β > 0.
(Proof: See Appendix C). Notice that this result does not rely on the discount factor. It
rather depends on the dispersion of the distribution of productivities. Notice that the closer
the mean productivity, w, is to the minimum productivity, w1, the larger the range of the
deflation rates for which the lemma holds. That is, the more skewed the distribution the
smaller the absolute value of w−w1
wn−w1 . Hence, the larger the range of θ for which Lemma 2
holds. The next Corollary tells us that we can always find a discount factor for which the
threshold level of inflation found in Lemma 2 satisfies 1 + θ = β.
Corollary 6. If β ≤ 1− w−w1
wn−w1 the full commitment allocation does not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint if 1 + θ = β.
The next proposition is more general and states the conditions under which the full
commitment allocation does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint even if the
government sets a deflation rate different from the rate of time preference.
Proposition 6. Given β > 0, there is θ such that if θ < θ then the full commitment
allocation does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
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Proof. Assumption 2, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that there exist θ such that VD
(
n, n, 0, θ
)
=
u (w) /(1− β). Hence, using Lemma 1, VD (n, n, 0, θ) = u (w) /(1− β) for any θ < θ.
Corollary 7. Given β > 0, for any θ < θ, the full commitment allocation is not the incentive
compatible steady state allocation.
The next proposition establishes, for any given inflation rate, the range of the discount
factor for which the full commitment allocation does not satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint.
Proposition 7. For any inflation rate θ˜ ∈ R there is an associated discount factor, β
(
θ˜
)
,
such that if β < β
(
θ˜
)
and θ ≤ θ˜, the full commitment allocation does not satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint.
(Proof: See Appendix C). The next Corollary tells us that it is possible to find a discount
factor such that the associated full commitment allocation does not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint for any non positive inflation rate.
Corollary 8. There is β (0) such that if β < β (0) and θ ≤ 0, the full commitment allocation
does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
Now we turn to characterize the degree of impatience, the level of β, for which the
full commitment allocation is not incentive compatible when the government follows the
Friedman rule.
Proposition 8. There is β∗ > 0 such that for all β < β∗ the full commitment allocation
does not satisfy the incentive compatibility if 1 + θ = β.
Proof. If follows from Corollary 6 that for any β ≤ 1 − w−w1
wn−w1 that VD (n, n, 0, 1− β) >
u (w) /(1−β). However, it could be the case that for all β < 1 the inequality VD (n, n, 0, 1− β) >
u (w) /(1 − β) holds, case in which β∗ = 1. If this were not the case, continuity of
VD (n, n, 0, 1− β) with respect to the discount factor that there is β∗ > 0 such that for
all β < β∗ VD (n, n, 0, 1− β) > u (w) /(1− β)
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Corollary 9. If β < β∗ the full commitment allocation is not a symmetric incentive com-
patible steady state allocation under the Friedman rule.
Now we can state a non existence result.
Proposition 9. If β < β∗ there is no equilibrium if the inflation rate satisfies 1 + θ = β.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Let us suppose that there exists an equilibrium. It
follows from Proposition 8 that the full commitment allocation does not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint. Hence, consumption depends on the individual state variable xt =
{jt, jt−1, dt−1, bt−1}. Using the first order condition with respect to precautionary money
holdings, the convexity of the marginal utility, u′′′(.) > 0, and the fact that consumption
varies across states we find that u′(c(xt)) ≥ E [u′(c(xt+1))/xt] > u′ (E [c(xt+1)/xt]), which
implies that consumption is growing in expected terms, E [c(xt+1)/xt] > c(xt). Adding across
households,
∫
Xt+1
[ct+1(xt+1)] dµt+1 =
∫
Xt
E [c(xt+1)/xt] dµt >
∫
Xt
ct(xt)dµt =
∫
Xt
w(xt)dµt =∫
Xt+1
w(xt+1)dµt+1, we find that the equilibrium allocation is not feasible. Thus, we incur in
a contradiction and, hence, equilibrium cannot exist.
Proposition 10. If β < β∗ there is θ∗ > β−1 such that if θ ≥ θ∗ the full commitment alloca-
tion satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint and, therefore, the equilibrium allocation
is optimal.
Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2, Assumption 2, and the continuity of VD (j, i, d, θ) with respect
to θ ensure that there exists θ∗ > β − 1 such that VD (n, n, 0, θ) = u(w)1−β . It follows from
Proposition 8 that θ∗ > β − 1.
Thus, we have shown that if households are sufficiently impatient, the optimal inflation
rate is larger than the discount rate. That is, the nominal interest rate is positive. The
question about the optimal inflation rate is, thus, quantitative.
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5.4 Some numerical examples
We have seen in the previous section that if households are sufficiently impatient the optimal
monetary policy entails an inflation rate greater than the preferences discount rate. This
result implies that the question about the level of the optimal inflation rate is quantitative.
Here we conduct some numerical exercises to illustrate our results.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Aiyagari (1994) argues
that a first-order autoregression closely matches the time series properties of the log of annual
earnings, with a range of 0.23 to 0.53 for the first-order serial correlation coefficient, ρ, and
a standard deviation in unconditional log of earnings, σw, of 20 to 40 percent,
ln (wt+1) = (1− ρ) ln (w) + ρ ln (wt) + σw
(
1− ρ2)1/2 -t, -t − Normal(0,1). (61)
We consider three possible values for the standard deviation, σw ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4}, and two
possible values for the correlation coefficient, ρ ∈ {0.23, 0.53}. We have assumed an instan-
taneous utility function u(c) = (c1−σ − 1) /(1− σ) with σ = 2.
In our first exercise we have set the discount factor, β equal to 0.94. We have computed
the expected utility associated to full commitment. We have also computed the expected
utility after default for the household with the highest utility yesterday and today, the period
when it declares default, assuming that it holds zero precautionary money balances at that
moment. We have computed it for various levels of the inflation rate. This is shown in
Figure 1. The first panel of Figure 1 shows both expected utilities when we assume that
the standard deviation of unconditional productivity is σw = 0.2. Notice that the optimal
inflation rate, the rate for which the expected utility associated to full commitment is exactly
equal to the expected utility after default, is negative and it increases with the degree of
productivity autocorrelation, ρ. This is so because, the larger the persistence in productivity,
the higher the expected utility of defaulting with the highest productivity. The second panel
shows both expected utilities assuming that the process for productivity is more volatile,
σw = 0.3. There we see that the optimal inflation rate is about 7 percent for ρ = 0.23 and
rises to almost 15 percent for ρ = 0.53. If the standard deviation of productivity is σw = 0.4,
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the optimal inflation rate is above 20 percent. Notice that if the government sets the optimal
inflation rate the implied real interest rate in equilibrium is 1/q− 1 = 1/β− 1, which is 6.38
percent in this case.
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Figure 1: The log of productivity w follows a first order autoregressive process with autocorrelation ρ
and standard deviation σw. The instantaneous utility function is u(c) =
(
c1−σ − 1) /(1 − σ), σ = 2, and
β = 0.94. “full commitment refers to expected utility in the full commitment allocation and “default” refers
to expected utility of the household with the highest productivity yesterday and today that defaults today
with zero precautionary money balances.
In our second exercise, shown in Figure 2, we have assumed that households are a a little
bit more patient, β = 0.96. In this case if σw = 0.2 the expected utility associated to full
commitment is higher than the utility of defaulting. This is why we do not report that case,
because the optimal inflation rate is the rate of time preference. If the standard deviation of
productivity is σw = 0.3 the optimal inflation rate is now about 0 and 1 percent, depending
on the autocorrelation of the productivity process. Finally, if σw = 0.4, the optimal inflation
rate is about 10 percent. Finally, notice that if the government sets the optimal inflation
rate the implied real interest rate in equilibrium is 1/q − 1 = 1/β − 1, which is 4.17 percent
in this case.
Some conclusions can be drawn from this exercise. The higher the patience, the lower
34
−4 0 5 10 15 20
−240
−235
−230
−225
−220
−215
−210
ρ = 0.23, σ
w
 = 0.3
full commitment
default
−4 0 5 10 15 20
−240
−235
−230
−225
−220
−215
−210
−205
ρ = 0.53, σ
w
 = 0.3
full commitment
default
−4 0 5 10 15 20
−235
−230
−225
−220
−215
−210
−205
−200
−195
inflation rate
ρ = 0.23, σ
w
 = 0.4
full commitment
default
−4 0 5 10 15 20
−240
−230
−220
−210
−200
−190
−180
ρ = 0.53, σ
w
 = 0.4
full commitment
default
inflation rate
Figure 2: The log of productivity w follows a first order autoregressive process with autocorrelation ρ
and standard deviation σw. The instantaneous utility function is u(c) =
(
c1−σ − 1) /(1 − σ), σ = 2, and
β = 0.96. “full commitment refers to expected utility in the full commitment allocation and “default” refers
to expected utility of the household with the highest productivity yesterday and today that defaults today
with zero precautionary money balances.
the optimal inflation rate. Larger dispersion in productivity, or higher autocorrelation,
imply a larger optimal inflation rate. Moreover, it looks like for reasonable parameter values
the implied optimal inflation rate is not too large, although is very sensitive to the type of
idiosyncratic uncertainty considered and the degree of patience. The range of values obtained
is comparable to those obtained by Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) and Akyol (2004), for
instance. Finally we should keep in mind that we have abstracted from any distortion that
the inflation tax may have, for instance, on leisure. Had we assumed that households valued
leisure we would have obtained a lower inflation rate for any discount factor and level of
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the optimal inflation rate would depend also on the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and leisure.
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6 A reinterpretation of the Cash-In-Advance frame-
work
It could be argued that the cash-in-advance (CIA) framework introduces money in an ad-
hoc manner and asked whether our analysis goes through in frameworks where the use of
money arises endogenously. For this reason we modify our original setting to derive the
CIA constraint endogenously. Let us assume that the world is populated by a measure 2 of
households. There are two types of the same size. Type I households produce at even periods
and consume at odd periods. Type II households produce at odd periods and consume at
even periods. There is only one perishable consumption good and utility is not transferable.
Within each type there are two subtypes of equal measure. When subtype (j, 1) produces wh
units of consumption good, the other subtype produces wl units of the consumption good,
and viceversa. At each period t there are two subperiods, day and night. Households can
use money and private bonds. The latter can be used for borrowing purposes. During the
day consumers and producers meet in a Walrasian market. The key features of the model
are that agents cannot commit to repay their debts and there is anonymity in the goods
market.
There is a government that controls the supply of money. The government injects (or
withdraws) money by transferring (or taxing) producers in the same manner than in section
2: transfers or taxes are proportional to producers’ productivity.
A credit market opens at night. Financial intermediation is done by perfectly competi-
tive firms. We denominate these firms, indistinctly, banks, financial intermediaries or credit
agencies. The financial intermediaries act as intermediaries so that private IOUs can cir-
culate. Banks lend money to borrowers, who, in exchange, sell private IOUs to the bank.
Lenders give money to the credit agency, which sells a bank IOU to the lenders. The agency
always commits to redeem its IOUs and cannot issue more IOUs than the amount of money
deposited by lenders. For this process to work we assume that banks have a technology that
allows record keeping. This record keeping, however, is limited to financial histories and not
available to track trading histories in the goods market. Agencies that operate this record
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keeping technology can do so at zero cost. If a household defects, its bond holdings are seized
and it is banned from the credit market forever. Specifically, banks keep track of defectors
and do not sell them any IOU thereafter. Defectors, however, keep their money holdings
and can use money for saving purposes after default.
The timing of the model is the following: First, consumers and producers meet in the
day market and exchange goods for assets. At night credit agencies open. Households
decide whether to keep participating in the credit market. (This is equivalent to saying that
households decide whether to repay their debts or to default on them). Households decide
the composition of their portfolio for next period.
The market structure described above implies that money is the only asset exchanged for
goods in the day market. The reason is the following: producers will never accept an IOU
issued by a consumer since households do not have any record keeping technology. It could
be thought, though, that producers would accept a bank IOU held by a consumer. If the
producer is a defaulter (it cannot participate in the credit market) he will never accept the
bank IOU since it will never be redeemed to him. If the producer is not a defaulter, the bank
neither redeems its IOU to the producer because the bank cannot record trading histories and
the goods market is anonymous. Moreover, in absence of record keeping of trading histories,
the consumer can always claim that he is the claimant of the bank IOU. Since consumption
has already taken place, there is no way of checking whether the transaction has taken
place or not. This is true even if the bank knows the household’s level of productivity each
period.7,8
Let us focus on a particular household of subtype i that is a producer at time t. It takes
in the day market the money exchanged by the goods they have produced, pt w
i
t. At night,
7Assuming that credit agencies cannot keep record of trading histories and anonymity in the goods
markets implies that bank IOUs are illiquid, as assumed by Kocherlakota (2002, 2003), although he refers
to government bonds (which are in positive supply).
8This framework is somewhat close to that of Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007). The main differences
are: there is no uncertainty about the periods when households are producers and consumers, utility is not
transferable, and there are no search frictions in the goods market.
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it faces the budget constraint
qnt B
i
t+1 +M
i
t+1 ≤ ptwit +Bit +M it + T it+1. (62)
Next period the household is a consumer. Then, in the day market it faces the constraint
pt+1c
i
t+1 ≤M it+1, (63)
whereas at night it faces the constraint
pt+1c
i
t+1 + q
n
t+1B
i
t+2 +M
i
t+2 ≤ Bit+1 +M it+1. (64)
We write everything in real terms, assuming a constant rate of inflation,
qtb
i
t+1 + (1 + θ)m
i
t+1 ≤ wit + bit +mit + (1 + θ)τ it+1, (65)
cit+1 ≤ mit+1, (66)
cit+1 + qt+1b
i
t+2 + (1 + θ)m
i
t+2 ≤ bit+1 +mit+1. (67)
Let us call dt+1 = m
i
t+1 − cit+1. Notice that dt = mit since the households does not consume
at time t. Thus we can rewrite the constraints in the following way,
qtb
i
t+1 + (1 + θ) (ct+1 + dt+1) ≤ wit + bit + dit + (1 + θ)τ it+1, (68)
dit+1 ≥ 0, (69)
qt+1b
i
t+2 + (1 + θ)m
i
t+2 ≤ bit+1 + dit+1. (70)
Assuming that money transfers are not redistributive, (1 + θ)τ it+1 =
wi
w
θm, the house-
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hold’s problem written recursively is the following:
V p (i, b, d; θ) = max
c≥0,
b′,
d′≥0
{u (c) + β V c (i, b′, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c+ q b′ + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wi + b+ d+ wiw θm,
V p (i, b, d; θ) ≥ V pD (i, d; θ) ,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa,
(71)
where V p (i, b, d; θ) is the value function of the households that produces goods today with
productivity i. V c (i, b′, d′; θ) denotes the value function next period, when it becomes a
consumer,
V c (i, b, d; θ) = max
b′,
d′≥0
{β V p (−i, b′, d′; θ)}
s. t. q b′ + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ b+ d
V c (i, b, d; θ) ≥ V cD (i, d; θ) ,
if i = h, then − j = l, and vice versa.
(72)
The value functions after default are
V pD (i, d; θ) = max
c≥0,
d′≥0
{u (c) + β V cD (i, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wi + d+ wiw θm,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa,
(73)
V cD (i, d; θ) = max
d′≥0
{β V pD (−i, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) d′ ≤ d,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa.
(74)
Lemma 3. The incentive compatibility constraint is never binding for consumers, V c (i, b, d; θ) ≥
V cD (i, d; θ), for all b ∈ R, d ≥ 0, i = h, l.
Proof. We sketch here the proof of the Lemma. If b ≥ 0 households are never better off
defaulting regardless of being producers or consumers. If b < 0 the consumer is indifferent
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between defaulting today and setting d′ = d/(1+ θ) and setting d′ = d/(1+ θ) and b′ = b/q.
That is, they are indifferent between defaulting today and rolling over the debt to the next
period. Therefore, V c (i, b, d; θ) ≥ β V pD (−i, d/(1 + θ); θ) = V cD (i, d; θ). Hence, the incentive
compatibility constraint is never binding for consumers.
Thus, we can write the household’s problem in the following way:
V p (i, b, d; θ) = max
c≥0, b′, b′′,
d′≥0, d′′≥0
{u (c) + β2 V p (−i, b′′, d′′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c+ q b′ + (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wi + b+ d+ wiw θm,
q b′′ + (1 + θ) d′′ ≤ b′ + d′,
V p (i, b, d; θ) ≥ V pD (i, d; θ) ,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa,
(75)
It is easy to check that, in equilibrium q ≤ 1+θ. In the case in which q < 1+θ the household
chooses d′ = 0. If q = 1 + θ the household is indifferent between money and bonds. Thus,
we can further rewrite the household’s problem as
V p (i, b, d; θ) = max
c≥0,
d′≥0
{u (c) + β2 V p (−i, b′, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c+ q2 b′ + q (1 + θ) d′ ≤ wi + b+ d+ wiw θm,
V p (i, b, d; θ) ≥ V pD (i, d; θ) ,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa.
(76)
The default problem collapses to
V pD (i, d; θ) = max
c≥0,
d′≥0
{u (c) + β2 V pD (−i, d′; θ)}
s. t. (1 + θ) c + (1 + θ)2 d′ ≤ wi + d+ wiw θm,
if i = h, then − i = l, and vice versa.
(77)
The symmetric incentive compatible steady state of this economy is the same of that of
our benchmark economy analyzed in section 4. We could extend this model assuming that
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productivity is stochastic and follows a Markov process as we did in section 5 and our results
would still hold.
Thus, the cash-in-advance constraint arises because trading in the goods market is anony-
mous and no agent can keep track of households’ trading histories.
7 Final comments
In this paper we have shown that the optimal monetary policy involves setting an inflation
rate larger than the associated to the Friedman rule whenever households cannot commit to
repay their debts and defaulters only can save in the form of money. Moreover, the optimal
inflation rate allows the economy to attain the efficient allocation. This is so because inflation
lowers the return to default and, therefore, rises the real interest rate and the amount of
credit. The first implication of this result is that the issue about the optimal inflation rate
is quantitative: we know that is larger than the associated to the Friedman rule if agents
are sufficiently impatient but its level depends, among other things, on the agents’ degree of
patience and the risk they face.
We have illustrated this result in a rather extreme economy. For instance, we have
assumed that default is punished with perpetual exclusion from the credit market. If the
exclusion entailed a finite number of periods, the return to default would be higher and,
hence, the optimal inflation rate would be even higher than in our current setup. On the
contrary, had we assumed that leisure is valued the optimal inflation rate would be lower
than in our current setup and would also depend on the elasticity between consumption and
leisure. Notice that these arguments are quantitative in nature and do not alter the first
result: the Friedman rule is no longer optimal. The numerical exercises we have conducted
suggest that our model economy does not deliver too high optimal inflation rates.
Our result depends critically on the government being unable to tax discriminate between
agents. If the government could impose discretionary taxes on agents it could perfectly mimic
a credit market and render it unnecessary. Moreover, the government could tax defaulters so
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that they could be reduced to autarky. In that case the Friedman rule would be optimal. This
is why we have tied our analysis assuming that government taxes (in the case of deflation)
or transfers (if there is inflation) are proportional. In this way the real value of earnings
does not depend on the inflation rate. Only the real return to money is affected. Thus, our
results stems solely from the effect that the inflation rate has on the return to default.
In our framework defectors only can save in the form of money balances. Implicitly we
have assumed that financial institutions can keep track of all financial histories and prevent
defectors from saving in private bonds. This assumption is crucial for our results. If banks
only could keep track of negative bond holdings, existence of credit needs of a real interest
rate equal to zero. Credit would be invariant with respect to the nominal interest rate and
the equilibrium allocation would not be efficient. Thus, allowing banks to monitor positive
bond holdings and seize defectors’ holdings gives a larger scope to monetary policy.
It could be thought that the cash-in-advance constraint is unnecessary since all our re-
sults steam from the fact that inflation reduces the return to default. If we eliminated the
cash-in-advance constraint all our results would hold. Households, though, would not hold
any money balances in equilibrium since the optimal monetary policy implies a positive
nominal interest rate. Therefore, for money and private bonds to coexist their real return
would have to be equal (an equal to zero in the certainty case). In such a case the equi-
librium would be the same that in the economy where defectors can save in the form of
private bonds, which assumes implicitly that banks cannot monitor positive bond holdings.
Eliminating the cash-in-advance constraint amounts to assuming that trading histories can
be monitored. Thus, we think of our model economy as one where banks cannot monitor
households’ trading histories—therefore, money is needed for transactions—but they can
monitor financial histories—therefore, banks can ban defectors from the credit market.
We have abstracted from government debt in this paper. Introducing government in this
framework has no effect if defectors are not allowed to purchase them. If defectors were
allowed to purchase unbacked government debt results would change. In such a case, gov-
ernment debt would replace money in defectors’ portfolios and the link between inflation
and the return to default (and, therefore, the volume of credit) would be severed. Nev-
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ertheless, results could be different if government debt is backed by taxation, because the
government could equalize the return to government debt to that of money. The question
that arises is the sustainable amount of government debt. Furthermore, government debt, as
money, cannot insure households against idiosyncratic risk. We leave this analysis for future
research.
We have also abstracted from capital accumulation. The critical issue is, then, whether
there is collateralized credit, and how collateralized and non collateralized credit coexist,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, in our model there is no default in equilibrium, contrary to what is observed. As
Kehoe and Levine (2006) argue, the incentive compatibility constraints assumed here require
complete contingent claims, and, in practice, these claims are implemented not through
Arrow securities, but rather through a combination of non-contingent assets and bankruptcy.
Thus, bankruptcy is a way of completing markets, as argued by Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2007). Nevertheless, we leave this question for future research.
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Appendix
A The benchmark model economy
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If no incentive compatibility constraint is binding, the equilibrium allocation is the
full commitment allocation and, since 1 + θ > β, dh = 0. If the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding for both types of households, both types would like borrow. In such
a case the equilibrium amount of credit must be zero, that is, we are effectively in the
default scenario and dh = 0 since 1 + θ > β. Let us suppose that only one incentive
compatibility constraint is binding in equilibrium. Since wh > wl and using the concavity
of the instantaneous utility function it must be the case that the incentive compatibility
constraint must be binding for the household that holds debt, that is, the household with
high productivity. Thus, q u′ (ch) > β u′ (cl) and q u′ (cl) = β u′ (ch). If dh > 0 it would imply
that (1 + θ)u′ (ch) = β u′ (cl), which implies that q > 1 + θ and (1 + θ)u′ (cl) < β u′ (ch),
which would imply that the household is not maximizing utility. Thus, dh = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Notice that when the inflation rate is zero, θ = 0, the amount of precautionary
holdings carried to the high state, dh, are zero. Moreover, by looking at (37) we can see that
the default allocation is feasible, zl + zh = wl + wh. Assumption 1 implies that u
′(wh) <
β u′(wl). This implies, by strict concavity of the instantaneous utility function, that there
is no other feasible allocation that gives at least the default utility. Thus, q(0) = 1 and
ch(0) > wl.
Whenever q ∈ [β, 1) the following system of equation should be satisfied
q u′ (cl) = β u′ (ch) , (78)
cl + ch = wl + wh, (79)
(1 + θ)u′ (zl) = β u′ (zh) , (80)
(1 + θ)zh + zl = (1 + θ)wl + wh, (81)
u (cl) + β u (ch) = u (zl) + β u (zh) . (82)
The Hessian of the above function 5 → 5 (for the variables cl, ch, zl, zh, 1/q) is non
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singular when q < 1:
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u′′(cl) −β u′′(ch)/q 0 0 −βu′(ch)
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 u′′(zl) − β1+θu′′(zh) 0
0 0 1 (1 + θ) 0
u′(cl) βu′(ch) −u′(zl) −βu′(zh) 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (83)
Using (78) and (80) the Hessian can be written as
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u′′ (cl) −β u′′(ch)/q 0 0 −βu′(ch)
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 u′′ (zl) − β1+θu′′ (zh) 0
0 0 1 (1 + θ) 0
u′ (cl) q u′(cl) −u′ (zl) −(1 + θ) u′ (zl) 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
, (84)
and finally,
H = βu′(ch)u′(cl) [1− q]
[
u′′(zl) (1 + θ) +
β
1 + θ
u′′(zh)
]
< 0. (85)
Applying the Cramer rule,
∂ q
∂ θ
= H−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u′′(cl) −βu′′(ch)/q 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 u′′(zl) − β1+θ u′′(zh) β(1+θ)2 u′(zh)
0 0 1 (1 + θ) zh
u′(cl) q u′(cl) −u′(zl) −u′(zl) (1 + θ) 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 0, (86)
∂ ch
∂ θ
= H−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u′′(cl) −βu′′(ch)/q 0 0 0
u′′(cl) 0 0 0 −βu′(ch)
1 0 0 0 0
0 β
(1+θ)2
u′(zh) u′′(zl) − β1+θ u′′(zh) 0
0 zh 1 (1 + θ) 0
u′(cl) 0 −u′(zl) −u′(zl) (1 + θ) 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0. (87)
It is easy to check, using the default budget constraint and recalling assumption 1 that
lim
θ→∞
VD(h, 0; θ) = u(wh) + β u(wl) < (1 + β)u (w) = V (h, d; β − 1) . (88)
Whenever θ = 0 we know that the only participation constrained steady state is the default
allocation,
VD(h, dh; 0) = V (h, dh; 0) > V (h, dh; β − 1) . (89)
Since V and VD are both continuous functions there exists θ
∗ such that VD (h, dh; θ∗) =
V (h, dh; θ
∗). It follows from the fact that the Hessian of the function that determines the
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equilibrium is non singular that θ∗ is unique.
B Defaulters can purchase bonds
The default’s problem is very similar to the household’s problem shown in (10) but for the
incentive compatibility constraint that must be substituted by a non negativity constraint
on the amount of bonds carried to next period. Since we are focusing on symmetric steady
states, we denote as ah and al the amount of bonds held when the household has high and low
productivity, respectively. In a symmetric equilibrium, the consumption allocation chosen
by a household with high productivity in trade solves the problem shown in (35). In the
case of default the allocation chosen solves the problem
max u (zl) + β u (zh)
s. t. (1 + θ) zl + q al + (1 + θ) dl =
(
1 + θ m
w
)
wh + ah + dh,
(1 + θ) zh + q ah + (1 + θ) dh =
(
1 + θ m
w
)
wl + al + dl,
aj ≥ 0,
dj ≥ 0.
(90)
We can write the intertemporal budget constraint in each case in the following way,
zl + q zh =
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wh + q
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wl +
1− q2
1 + θ
ah +
q − (1 + θ)
1 + θ
dh, (91)
cl + q ch =
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wh + q
1 + θ m
w
1 + θ
wl +
1− q2
1 + θ
bh +
q − (1 + θ)
1 + θ
dh. (92)
The following proposition establishes the portfolio allocation of defaulters:
Proposition 11. For any 1+θ > β, the amount of precautionary money balances and bonds
held in the high productivity state are zero, ah = dh = 0.
Proof. If the non negativity constraint is not binding for both al and ah the consumption
allocation is the full commitment allocation. Since 1 + θ > β this implies that dh = dl = 0
and, therefore ah < 0, which contradicts the fact that defaulters cannot borrow. Thus,
the non negativity constraint must bind for some productivity state. Since wh > wl and
utility is concave, the constraint must bind only when the household has low productivity.
This implies that ah = 0. Since the constraint is not binding for the household with high
productivity, q u′ (zl) = β u′ (zh). If dh > 0 the non negativity constraint is not binding for
dh this would imply, using the first order conditions with respect to money and bonds, that
q > 1 + θ and (1 + θ) u′ (zl) = β u′ (zh), which contradicts the fact that the defaulter is
maximizing utility. Thus, dh = 0.
For a high productivity households that is evaluating whether to default or not, dh = dh.
Thus, the comparison of both budgets constraints, (91) and (92), shows clearly that the
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bond price must be equal to 1. The reason is that if q > 1 the default allocation would be in
the interior of the budget constraint in trade, since bh < 0. Hence, the household with high
productivity would get strictly higher utility in trade than in default. Thus, none would
default. But, if such were the case, the equilibrium allocation would be the full commitment
allocation and the bond price would be equal to the discount factor, q = β and we would
arrive to a contradiction. On the other hand, if q < 1, the trade allocation would be in
the interior of the default budget set. There would not be credit in equilibrium. Therefore,
q = 1.
C Idiosyncratic uncertainty
The household’s problem
Let us write the household’s budget constraint in sequential form. wt denotes the household
current state. This random variable is Markov and takes values in the countable set W.
The vector wt denotes a possible history of events for the household up to time t and Π (wt)
is the probability of such an event. The monetary policy is not contingent since there is no
aggregate uncertainty and follows the law
Mt+1 = (1 + θ)Mt. (93)
This also implies that, in steady state, the price of the consumption good only depends on
the inflation rate. The problem solved by a household is
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
∞∑
t=0
Π (wt)u (cit (w
t))
s. t. pt c
i
t (w
t) +
∑
l
qnt (w
t, wl)B
i
t+1 (w
t, wl) +M
i
t+1 (w
t) ≤
ptw
i
t +B
i
t (w
t) +M it (w
t−1) + T it+1 (w
t) ,
ptc
i
t (w
t) ≤M it (wt) ,
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∞∑
s=t
Π (ws) u (cis (w
s)) ≥
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∞∑
s=t
Π (ws) u (zis (w
s)) , for all t.
(94)
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where
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∞∑
s=t
Π (ws) u (zis (w
s)) is the maximum utility being out of trade (default),
max
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∞∑
s=t
Π (ws) u (zis (w
s))
s. t. ps z
i
s (w
s) +M is+1 (w
s) ≤ pswis +M is (ws−1) + T is+1 (ws) ,
psc
i
s (w
s) ≤M is (ws) ,
M it (w
t) given.
(95)
Denote bit+1 (w
t, wl) = B
i
t+1 (w
t, wl) /pt+1 and qt (w
t, wl) = (1 + θ)q
n
t (w
t, wl). Furthermore,
mit+1 (z
t) = M it+1 (w
t) /pt+1. Notice that the household enters period t + 1 with a given
amount of money, but it can decide to consume a lower amount. In the case in which
the cash-in-advance constraint is slack consumption and precautionary money balances are
contingent to the household’s state in t+ 1,
cit+1
(
wt, wt+1
)
+ dit+1
(
wt, wt+1
)
= mit+1
(
wt
)
, for all wt+1 ∈W. (96)
The household’s problem can be written as
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
∞∑
t=0
∏
(wt)u (cit (w
t))
s. t. (1 + θ)
(
cit+1 (w
t, wt+1) + d
i
t+1 (w
t, wt+1)
)
+
∑
l
qt (w
t, wl) b
i
t+1 (w
t, wl) ≤
wit + b
i
t (w
t) + dit (w
t) + (1 + θ)τ it+1 (w
t) , for all wt+1 ∈W,
dit+1 (w
t, wt+1) ≥ 0, for all wt+1 ∈W,
∞∑
t=0
βt
∞∑
t=0
∏
(wt)u (cit (w
t)) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βt
∞∑
t=0
∏
(wt) u (zit (w
t)) .
(97)
The household’s problem after default is
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
∞∑
t=0
∏
(wt)u (zit (w
t))
s. t. (1 + θ)
(
zit+1 (w
t, wt+1) + d
i
t+1 (w
t, wt+1)
) ≤
wit + d
i
t (w
t) + (1 + θ)τ it+1 (w
t) , for all wt+1 ∈W,
dit+1 (w
t, wt+1) ≥ 0, for all wt+1 ∈W.
(98)
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We can rewrite the household’s problem in trade and after default shown in (97) and (98)
very easily and obtain their recursive formulation shown in (47) and (48).
Equilibrium
We denote X = {W × R × [0, d]} as the set where the individual state variable x can
take values. We assume that d is sufficiently large. We construct a Markov process for
the individual state variables from the Markov process on the shocks and the decision rules
of the agents (see Huggett 1993 or Hopenhayn and Prescott 1992 for details). Let B be
the σ-algebra generated in X by, say, the open intervals. A probability measure µ over B
exhaustively describes the economy by stating how many households there are of each type.
Let P (x,B) denote the probability that a type {x} has of becoming of a type in B ⊂ B. The
function P naturally describes how the economy moves over time by generating a probability
measure for tomorrow, µ′, given a probability measure, µ, today. The exact way in which
this occurs is
µ′(B) =
∫
X
P (x,B) dµ. (99)
To find a steady state, we look for the measure of households µ such that given the prices
implied by that measure, households actions reproduce the same measure µ in the following
period.
Definition 2. A participation constrained steady state equilibrium for this economy is a mon-
etary policy, θ, an aggregate amount of money balances m, a set of bond prices, q (j, s), a set
of functions
{
V (x; θ) , gc (x; θ), gb (x; θ), gd (x; θ)
}
,
{
VD (j, d; θ), f
d (j, i, d; θ) , f z (j, i, d; θ)
}
and a measure of households µ such that:
1. given µ, the monetary policy θ, q (j, s), m, and the functions
{
V (x; θ) , gc (x; θ),
gb (x; θ), gd (x; θ)
}
solve the household’s problem, shown in (47)
2.
{
VD (j, i, d; θ), f
d (j, i, d; θ) , f z (j, i, d; θ)
}
solve the default problem, shown in (48)
3. markets clear,
(a)
∫
X
gc(x) d µ =
∫
X
w dµ,
(b)
∫
X
gb(x) d µ = 0,
(c) m =
∫
X
(
gd(x) + gc(s)
)
d µ,
4. and the measure of household is stationary, µ(B) =
∫
X
P (x,B) d µ, for all B ⊂ B.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that there exists a symmetric steady state in which consumption varies across
states. Without loss of generality assume that there exist two states, j1 and j2, for which
cj2 < cj1 . Lets us denote as dj1 and dj2 the amount of precautionary savings associated to
each state. Using the budget constraint shown in (55) we know that cj1 + dj1 = cj2 + dj2.
Therefore, dj2 > dj1 ≥ 0. Since dj2 > 0 the first order condition shown in (51) should hold
with strict equality. Since β ≤ 1 + θ, it follows that
u′ (cj2) ≤
n∑
κ=1
πj1κu
′ (cκ) . (100)
Strict concavity of the instantaneous utility function, implies that u′ (cj1) < u
′ (cj2). There-
fore, there must exist j3 such that u
′ (cj2) < u
′ (cj3), which implies that dj3 > dj2. Following
the argument and using Assumption 3, since the set of possible productivity estates is count-
able we should find dj1 > dj2 and we arrive to a contradiction. Therefore, cj = c for any
productivity state j. Applying clearing market conditions it should be the case that cj = w
for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let θ2 < θ1, and define
W1 (j, i, d; θ2, θ1) = max
z≥0
{
u (z) + β
n∑
κ=1
πiκVD (i, κ, d
′; θ1)
}
s. t. z + d′ ≤ wj + 11+θ2 d,
d′ ≥ 0.
(101)
Clearly, W1 (j, i, d; θ2, θ1) > V (j, i, d; θ1). Now define the sequence of functions {W} such
that
W+1 (j, i, d; θ2, θ1) = max
z≥0
{
u (z) + β
n∑
κ=1
πiκW (i, κ, d
′; θ2, θ1)
}
s. t. z + d′ ≤ wj + 11+θ2 d,
d′ ≥ 0.
(102)
Notice that V (j, i, d; θ2) > W+1 (j, i, d; θ2, θ1) and thatW+1 (j, i, d; θ2, θ1) > W (j, i, d; θ2, θ1),
for all 2. Hence, it follows that V (j, i, d; θ2) > V (j, i, d; θ1).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let us assume that the household with high productivity has zero money balances at
the time of default. If θ ≤ − w−w1
wn−w1 it is possible to accumulate enough real money balances
to ensure the full commitment level of consumption, w, even if the productivity state is the
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lowest possible, w1, thereafter. That is, the budget constraint at time t is
dt+1 = wt +
1
1 + θ
dt − ct. (103)
let us assume that at t = 1, the period when the household defaults, the productivity is wn
and for any subsequent period t > 1 is the lowest, w1 and assume that ct = w. For this plan
to be affordable it has to be the case that
dt+1 = w1 +
1
1 + θ
dt − w ≥ 0. (104)
Assuming that at the period of default the household consumes w we get that d1 = wn−w. If
θ ≤ − w−w1
wn−w1 we can easily check that dt+1 ≥ 0, for any t > 1. Therefore, V (n, i, 0; θ) >
u(w)
1−β ,
for all i, for all β > 0. Since V (n, i, d; θ) is increasing in the amount of real money balances,
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Let us take the default function for the household with highest productivity and
compare VD
(
n, n, 0; θ
) − u(w)
1−β > u (wn) +
β
1−β u (w1) − u (w)− β1−β u (w) = u (wn)− u (w)
+ β
1−β
(
u (w1)−u (w)
)
. Taking limits with respect to the discount factor, lim
β→0
(
VD
(
n, n, 0; θ˜
)
− u(w)
1−β
)
≥
lim
β→0
(
u (wn)− u (w) + β1−β (u (w1)− u (w))
)
= u (wn)− u (w) > 0. If follows from continu-
ity of VD (j, i, d; θ) that there exists β
(
θ
)
such that its associated discount factor satisfies
VD
(
n, n, 0; θ
)
= u(w)
1−β(θ) and that for all β < β
(
θ
)
VD
(
n, n, 0; θ
)
> u(w)
1−β . Furthermore, it fol-
lows from Lemma 1 that if θ ≤ θ and β ≤ β (θ), VD (n, n, 0; θ) ≥ VD (n, n, 0; θ) > u(w)1−β .
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